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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Twenty-seven employees of the Federal Detention 
Center in Philadelphia (―FDC Philadelphia‖) appeal the 
District Court‘s denial of their motion to dismiss Peter 
Bistrian‘s multiple claims.  Bistrian asserts that, while he was 
awaiting sentencing on wire-fraud charges, prison 
investigators used him to intercept notes being passed among 
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other inmates, and then failed to protect him after they 
flubbed the operation and the inmates discovered his 
involvement.  When the target inmates threatened to retaliate, 
Bistrian contends he repeatedly begged the officials 
responsible for help, but no one took any preventive 
measures.  Later, one of the inmates against whom Bistrian 
had cooperated, along with two others, beat him while they 
were together in a locked recreation pen.  A few months later, 
an inmate wielding a razor-blade type weapon also attacked 
Bistrian in the recreation pen.  In addition, Bistrian claims 
that certain chunks of the 447 days he spent in administrative 
segregation violated his substantive due process, procedural 
due process, and free speech rights.  
Bistrian‘s 108-page Second Amended Complaint (the 
―Complaint‖) includes 19 counts, 309 paragraphs, and an 
additional 114 pages of exhibits.  After the District Court‘s 
ruling, six counts survived against 28 defendants.  Though we 
pare down this action further as to both the number of 
defendants and claims, those that remain are plausible and 
can proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage.  Thus, we 
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings 




                                              
1
 When reviewing the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, we must accept as true all well-pled factual 
allegations as well as all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from them, and construe those allegations in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff.  See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 
F.3d 223, 229-30 (3d Cir. 2010).  As such, we set out facts as 
they appear in the Complaint and its exhibits.  See id. at 230 
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A. Bistrian Enters the Special Housing Unit  
  (“SHU”) for the First Time 
Bistrian was a detainee at FDC Philadelphia from 
August 2005 — when he was arrested on federal wire fraud-
related charges — until his sentencing in March 2008.  App. 
74 ¶ 9; 186; 235.  During that time he clocked four spells, 
totaling 477 non-consecutive days, in the Special Housing 
Unit (―SHU‖).  App. 81 ¶ 39. 
The SHU is a segregated housing unit where inmates 
may be placed for either administrative or disciplinary 
reasons.  App. 74-76 ¶¶ 11-17.  Inmates are confined in 
solitary or near-solitary conditions in a six-by-eight foot cell 
―for 23 to 24 hours a day, with little or no opportunity to 
interact with other inmates.‖  App. 75 ¶12.  They face sensory 
deprivation, reduced access to medical care, and increased 
suicidal tendencies.  App. 75 ¶¶ 12-13. 
Administrative detention in the SHU can occur for a 
variety of reasons.  App. 76 ¶¶ 18-27.  If an ―inmate‘s 
continued presence in the general population poses a serious 
threat to life, property, self, staff, other inmates or the security 
or orderly running of the institution,‖ then the Warden may 
place the inmate in administrative detention if (among other 
reasons) an investigation of an inmate is pending for violating 
prison regulations or the inmate requests admission for 
protective purposes.  App. 76 ¶ 19 (quoting 28 C.F.R. 
§ 541.22(a)).
2
  Bureau of Prison (―BOP‖) regulations require 
                                                                                                     
(noting that a court can consider ―exhibits attached to the 
complaint‖ when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). 
 
2
 Some of the regulations that Bistrian quotes or cites in the 
Complaint (filed in July 2009) have since been amended.  In 
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the Warden of a detention facility to prepare an administrative 
order ―detailing the reasons for placing an inmate in 
administrative detention‖ within 24 hours of the inmate‘s 
placement, and to provide a copy to the inmate.  App. 77 ¶ 20 
(quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.22(b)).  In addition, a Segregation 
Review Officer (―SRO‖) must make ongoing determinations 
about the appropriateness of the inmate‘s continued housing 
in administrative detention.  App. 77-78 ¶¶ 21-27. 
Disciplinary segregation is principally reserved for 
inmates ―officially designated as exhibiting violent or 
seriously disruptive behavior while incarcerated.‖  App. 74-
75 ¶ 11; 78-80 ¶¶ 28-37.  Only a Discipline Hearing Officer 
(―DHO‖) may impose disciplinary segregation, and may do 
so only after a hearing finding the inmate has committed a 
serious prohibited act.  App. 78-80 ¶¶ 29-37.  An SRO must 
also monitor inmates in disciplinary segregation and make 
determinations about the appropriateness of their continued 
separation.  App. 80 ¶ 36.   
On November 18, 2005, Bistrian was transferred out of 
the general prison population and into administrative 
detention in the SHU because he supposedly abused his 
telephone privileges.  App. 85 ¶ 57.  On December 9, 2005, a 
DHO sanctioned him to 30 days‘ disciplinary segregation for 
the alleged infractions.  App. 85 ¶¶ 59.  Bistrian was released 
from the SHU on January 9, 2006.  Id.  The propriety of this 
30-day disciplinary segregation is not at issue here. 
According to the Complaint, Warden Troy Levi failed 
to prepare an administrative detention order detailing the 
                                                                                                     
the background section of this opinion, we refer to and quote 
the regulations as they appear in the Complaint.  Current 




reasons for Bistrian‘s detention and to provide him with a 
copy within 24 hours of his initial confinement on November 
18.  App. 85 ¶ 60.  Bistrian also claims an SRO failed to 
conduct, as required by BOP regulations, reviews of his 
placement in administrative detention between November 18 
and December 9.  App. 86 ¶ 61. 
B. Bistrian Enters the SHU a Second Time 
Shortly after Bistrian‘s release from the SHU on 
January 9, 2006, FDC officials again accused him of violating 
the telephone rules and placed him back in the SHU for 
administrative detention on January 25.  App. 86 ¶ 63.  This 
time Bistrian remained there for 308 days, until his release on 
December 8.  Id.  He claims that Warden Levi again did not 
prepare a timely and appropriate administrative detention 
order.  App. 86 ¶ 64.   
Bistrian also alleges that Warden Levi and nine other 
FDC officials (together the ―Prison Management 
Defendants‖)3 met on a weekly basis to discuss the status of 
SHU inmates and to determine whether any of them should 
be released back into the general prison population.  App. 80 
¶ 38.  He claims that, during his second stay in the SHU, 
prison officials did not investigate the alleged phone abuse 
that was the supposed reason for his confinement.  Instead, 
they intentionally confined him in administrative segregation 
under the pretext of a non-existent investigation in order to 
                                              
3
 This group consists of Warden Levi, Assistant Wardens 
Brown and Blackman, five members of the Corrections 
Officers staff (Captain David Knox, Lt. David Gibbs, Sr. 
Officer William Jezior, Sr. Officer Bergos and Unit Manager 
White), and two Special Investigative Agents (J. McLaughlin 
and David Garraway).  App. 80-81 ¶ 38. 
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bypass the procedural protections required for disciplinary 
segregation.  App. 86-87 ¶¶ 65-67.   
1. Bistrian Collaborates with the Federal  
 Bureau of Investigation (―FBI‖) 
In April or May 2006, Steve Northington (another 
SHU detainee) asked Bistrian (then an orderly in the SHU) to 
pass along a note to his fellow gang member and SHU 
detainee, Kaboni Savage.  App. 89 ¶¶ 72, 74.  Bistrian agreed, 
but later advised Lt. Gibbs and Sr. Officers Bowns, Jezior, 
and Bergos that he had done so.  App. 89 ¶ 73.  Northington 
and Savage are members of a drug gang from North 
Philadelphia.  App. 89 ¶ 74.  They have long and violent 
criminal careers with prior convictions for, among other 
things, robbery and aggravated assault.  App. 89 ¶¶ 74-76.  
During a court-authorized wiretap of his SHU cell, Savage 
was caught on tape repeatedly threatening in graphic detail to 
kill the witnesses against him, their wives, parents, siblings, 
and young children.  App. 89 ¶ 76 (citing Government‘s 
Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Kaboni Savage, 
Criminal No. 04-269-01 (E.D. Pa. March 15, 2006)). 
The FBI expressed interest in the notes being passed 
among Northington, Savage, and other detainees, because 
they were defendants in an ongoing drug gang prosecution 
that involved substantial witness intimidation, death threats to 
witnesses and law enforcement, and a firebombing that killed 
six family members of the Government‘s chief cooperating 
witness.  App. 90 ¶¶ 78-79.  After consulting with the FBI, 
Lt. Gibbs and Sr. Officers Bowns, Jezior, and Bergos 
instructed Bistrian to continue passing notes for the inmates.  
App. 90 ¶ 80.  They told him, however, to bring the notes to 
the Special Investigative Services (―SIS‖) office at FDC 
Philadelphia first.  App. 90 ¶¶ 80. 
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Bistrian passed several notes among Northington, 
Savage, and two other detainees over the next few weeks.  
App. 90 ¶ 81.  Each time, Bistrian would bring the note to the 
SIS office.  Lt. Gibbs, Sr. Officers Bowns, Jezior, and Bergos, 
Special Investigative Agents McLaughlin and Garraway, and 
Lts. Rodgers and Robinson would review the note, photocopy 
it if necessary, and then give it back to Bistrian with 
instructions to deliver it.  App. 90 ¶ 81.  Lt. Gibbs, Sr. 
Officers Bowns, Jezior, and Bergos, and Special Investigative 
Agents McLaughlin and Garraway forwarded some 
photocopies to the FBI.  App. 90 ¶ 82.   
But ―[o]n one particular occasion‖ when Bistrian 
brought in a note for photocopying, Lt. Gibbs and Sr. Officers 
Bowns, Jezior, and Bergos placed the photocopy back in the 
delivery envelope instead of the original note.  App. 91 ¶ 84.  
Bistrian claims that the note‘s intended recipient recognized it 
as a photocopy and immediately realized Bistrian‘s 
cooperation with prison officials.  App. 91 ¶ 84.  Bistrian also 
alleges that, on unspecified occasions, Lts. Gibbs, Rodgers, 
and Robinson, Sr. Officers Bowns, Jezior, and Bergos, and 
Special Investigative Agents McLaughlin and Garraway 
failed to return to him all notes for delivery, further notifying 
the intended recipients of his cooperation.  App. 91 ¶ 85.   
Bistrian began receiving multiple threats from the 
notes‘ intended recipients, including Northington, who 
threatened him on more than one occasion when they were 
together in the recreation yard.  App. 91-92 ¶ 86.  According 
to Bistrian, he ―repeatedly advised (both verbally and in 
writing)‖ FDC officials—including Lts. Gibbs, Rodgers, and 
Robinson, Sr. Officers Bowns, Jezior, and Bergos, and 
Special Investigative Agents McLaughlin and Garraway—of 
the threats and the risks he faced by being confined in the 
SHU with the Northington gang.  App. 92 ¶ 87.  He insisted 
that members of Northington‘s gang would seriously harm 
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him if they were placed in the recreation yard with him at the 
same time. App. 92 ¶ 87.  Despite these warnings, FDC 
officials took no preventive action. 
2. Bistrian is Attacked for the First Time 
On June 30, 2006, Bistrian was standing in the SHU 
recreation yard (a locked pen with guards posted on the 
outside) when Northington and two other SHU inmates 
approached him and began arguing about a note that he failed 
to deliver.  App. 93 ¶ 92; 237.  When Bistrian turned away, 
Northington punched him in the face.  App. 93 ¶ 93.  Bistrian 
was then knocked to the ground and went unconscious when 
his head hit a cement portion of the yard‘s metal cages.  Id.  
While he lay unconscious, Northington and the other inmates 
repeatedly kicked and beat him, landing blows to his face, 
head, body, and midsection.  App. 93 ¶ 94.   
Bistrian claims that FDC guards, including Sr. Officer 
Jezior, intervened ―[o]nly after several minutes of continued 
pummeling.‖  App. 93-94 ¶ 95.  According his incident 
report, Sr. Officer Jezior came to the SHU recreation pen in 
response to an alarm and, on his arrival, saw an inmate 
beating Bistrian in the face with closed fists.  App. 250.  
Several staff members, including Jezior, shouted orders to the 
inmate to stop and back away from Bistrian, but the inmate 
continued his beating.  Id.  When ―enough staff were 
present,‖ officers entered the recreation pen and the assaulting 
inmate got down on his stomach and allowed himself to be 
handcuffed without further incident.  Id.  By then Bistrian had 
already suffered a dislocated left shoulder, broken teeth, and 
multiple contusions and lacerations to his head and face that 
required sutures.  App. 94 ¶ 97. 
Special Investigative Agent McLaughlin interviewed 
Northington after the attack.  Presumably when asked why he 
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attacked Bistrian, ―Northington stated that he got 19 and a 
half years because of rats and now inmate Bistrian is being 
used to get him [Northington] another case.‖  App. 237.  
Another inmate involved in the attack admitted that he 
previously put a sign on his cell that read ―stop snitching.‖  
App. 238. 
Bistrian remained in the SHU after the attack.  On July 
6, 2006, Lt. Wilson prepared an administrative order 
purporting to place him in administrative detention for 
―security reasons.‖  App. 94 ¶ 99.  Bistrian claims that neither 
Warden Levi nor Lt. Wilson gave him a copy of this order, as 
required by prison regulations.  App. 95 ¶ 100.   
3. Bistrian is Attacked a Second Time 
On October 12, 2006, Bistrian was attacked again in 
the SHU recreation yard.  App. 96 ¶ 106.  He was in hand 
restraints, waiting to be let in from the yard, when Aaron 
Taylor (an inmate with a history of violently attacking fellow 
detainees) approached him waving a ―manufactured razor-
blade style weapon, repeatedly slashing and cutting [his] face, 
arms, and legs.‖  App. 96-97 ¶¶ 106-07. 
FDC guards and staff, including Captain Knox and 
Lts. Acker and Dempsey, attempted to stop the attack by 
firing pepper spray into the recreation cage.  App. 97 ¶ 109; 
269.  This proved ineffective, so after several minutes they 
used a ―Tactical Blast Stun Munition,‖ which incapacitated 
Taylor and allowed staff members to enter the area to attend 
to Bistrian.  App. 97 ¶ 109.  Lt. Acker interviewed Bistrian 
after the attack and asked him what happened.  App. 276.  
According to Lt. Acker‘s report, Bistrian told him that Taylor 
yelled ―You racist mother fucker!,‖ and then attacked him 
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even though Bistrian had never spoken to Taylor before the 
incident.  App. 276.
4
 
Bistrian was transported to a local hospital, where he 
received 52 sutures to close his wounds.  App. 97 ¶ 112.  The 
attack left him with scars on his face and body as well as 
severe mental, emotional, and psychological injuries.  App. 
98 ¶ 113.  Despite several requests, prison officials did not 
allow him to see a medical doctor again until November 9, 
2006.  App. 98 ¶ 114.  After a brief examination, medical 
staff told Bistrian that ―he was going to have to be ‗creative‘ 
at physical rehabilitation due to his confinement in the SHU.‖  
App. 98 ¶ 114.  Bistrian was released from the SHU on 
December 8, 2006, and transferred back to the general 
population.  App. 99 ¶ 118.   
C. Bistrian Enters the SHU a Third Time 
After learning that they had placed Bistrian in the same 
unit as one of his June 30
 
assailants, FDC officials returned 
Bistrian to the SHU for a third time on December 22, 2006; 
he remained there until January 25, 2007.  App. 99 ¶¶ 118-19. 
Bistrian alleges that the Prison Management 
Defendants violated several prison regulations when moving 
him back to the SHU.  For example, Warden Levi once again 
failed to prepare a timely and appropriate administrative 
detention order.  App. 99  ¶ 121 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 
541.22(b)).  Also, because they placed Bistrian in 
                                              
4
 Taylor was later convicted of assault with a dangerous 
weapon, 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3), and sentenced to 120 months‘ 
imprisonment.  We recently affirmed his conviction and 
described the racial tensions apparently inflaming inmates at 
FDC Philadelphia at the time of the attack.  See United States 
v. Taylor, 686 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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administrative segregation for protective purposes but not at 
his own request, the Prison Management Defendants were 
required to review his status within two work days and hold a 
hearing within seven days of his placement, but they failed to 
do so.  App. 100 ¶¶ 122-24. 
D. Bistrian Enters the SHU a Fourth Time 
After having been in and out of the SHU three times, 
Bistrian met with forensic psychologist Dr. Stephen E. 
Samuel.  In August 2007, Dr. Samuel informed the FDC‘s 
chief psychologist that he had diagnosed Bistrian with Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder and Dysthymic Disorder resulting 
from his long-term confinement in the SHU and the two 
attacks he suffered.  App. 100 ¶ 125. 
That month, Bistrian participated in the first of two 
sentencing hearings in his criminal case.  App. 100 ¶ 126.  In 
court filings and at the hearing, his counsel contested the 
legality of his placement in the SHU and his other 
mistreatment in prison.  Id.  Following the hearing, on 
September 12, 2007, Bistrian‘s attorney sent an email to the 
Assistant United States Attorney handling the sentencing, 
repeating his challenge to the purported telephone violation 
charges against Bistrian that had been used to justify his first 
two placements in the SHU and demanding a copy of the 
applicable prison regulations.  App. 101 ¶ 127. The AUSA 
forwarded the email to FDC Philadelphia.  Id. 
The next day, Bistrian returned to the SHU, received 
an administrative detention order indicating that he was being 
held ―pending investigation‖ of alleged telephone infractions; 
and attended a hearing before the Unit Disciplinary 
Committee, where he promptly received a sanction of a loss 
of phone privileges for 60 days.  App. 101 ¶¶ 128-30. 
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Four days later, Bistrian‘s counsel wrote a letter to 
Warden Levi to request that he release Bistrian from the SHU 
and to inform him that Bistrian continued to suffer from 
physical and psychological injuries as a result of his prior 
confinement in the SHU and the two prior assaults. App. 101-
102 ¶ 131.  During this stint in the SHU, Warden Levi told 
Bistrian he ―would not see the light of day again.‖ App. 102 
¶¶ 133.  He also sent FDC staff members to coerce Bistrian 
into confessing by telling him that he would not be released 
from the SHU unless he confessed to the alleged violations.  
App.  102 ¶ 134.  Bistrian remained in the SHU until 
December 4, 2007. App. 102 ¶ 132.     
On March 14, 2008, Judge DuBois sentenced Bistrian 
to 57 months‘ imprisonment.  App. 8. 
II. Procedural Background 
Bistrian filed this suit in June 2008.  Of the 19 counts 
in the Complaint, Counts I-V allege violations of Bistrian‘s 
Fifth Amendment substantive and procedural due process 
rights, Counts VI-IX relate to the Eighth Amendment, Count 
X is a First Amendment retaliation claim, and Counts XI-XIX 
are against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (―FTCA‖).  Bistrian seeks $50 million in damages against 
the FDC defendants in addition to other relief.  See, e.g., App. 
109 ¶ 156.   
 
Each of the defendants moved to dismiss the 
Complaint, arguing, among other things, that Bistrian failed 
to exhaust his administrative remedies, that his claims were 
untimely, and that he failed to allege sufficient facts to state 
claims that overcome their entitlement to qualified immunity.  
The District Court granted motions to dismiss 13 of the 19 
counts (Counts VI-IX and XI-XIX).  The propriety of these 
dismissals is not before us.   
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The Court denied, however, the FDC defendants‘ 
motion to dismiss Counts I-V and Count X.  The Court found 
that Bistrian adequately alleged individual involvement of the 
28 named defendants in the constitutional torts at issue to 
survive dismissal on qualified immunity grounds.   
 
Twenty-seven of the 28 defendants appeal the District 
Court‘s refusal to dismiss Count I-V and X.  In his appellate 
brief, Bistrian — ―[i]n the interests of narrowing the scope of 
this action‖— does not oppose Appellants‘ challenge to his 
claim sounding in deliberate indifference to medical needs 
(Count IV, Fifth Amendment), but he intends to proceed on 
that claim against defendant Reynolds, who has not appealed 
the District Court‘s decision.  Bistrian Br. 2.  He also 
concedes in his brief to the dismissal of Appellants Martinez, 
Kaiser, Dalmasi, Fausto, Bokhari, Alsbrooks, Zorrilla, Massa, 
and Still.  Id. at 2-3.  Counsel further clarified the 
configuration of claims and appellants in play at oral 
argument.  
 
Taking into account the District Court‘s decision and 
Bistrian‘s concessions and clarifications, the following claims 
and persons are at issue in this appeal. 
 
Count I:  Fifth Amendment Substantive Due Process (Failure 
to Protect)  
 
 Claim:  Appellants failed to protect Bistrian from the 
June 30, 2006 assault, both before and during the 
attack.   
 
 Appellants/defendants (13):  (1-10) The 10 Prison 
Management Defendants; (11) Sr. Officer Bowns; (12) 




Count II:  Fifth Amendment Substantive Due Process (Failure 
to Protect) 
 
 Claim:  Appellants failed to protect Bistrian from the 
October 12, 2006 assault, both before and during the 
attack.   
 
 Appellants/defendants (12):  (1-10) The 10 Prison 
Management Defendants; (11) Lt. Dempsey; and (12) 
Lt. Acker. 
 
Count III:  Fifth Amendment Substantive Due Process 
(Punitive Detention) 
 Claim:  Bistrian‘s placement and continued detention 
in the SHU deprived him of his liberty interest, as an 
inmate awaiting sentencing, in being free from 
punishment. 
 
 Appellants/defendants (13):  (1-10) The 10 Prison 
Management Defendants; (11) Lt. Rodgers; (12) Lt. 
Robinson; and (13) Lt. Armisak. 
 
Count V:  Fifth Amendment Procedural Due Process 
 Claim:  Bistrian‘s placement and continued detention 
in the SHU failed to comply with the Fifth 
Amendment‘s procedural due process requirements. 
 
 Appellants/defendants (11):  (1-10) The 10 Prison 




Count X:  First Amendment (Retaliation) 
 Claim:  Bistrian‘s placement and continued detention 
in SHU after his attorney challenged his previous 
placement as retaliatory for exercising First 
Amendment rights. 
 




III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
The collateral order doctrine allows this appeal because it is 
from an order denying a motion to dismiss that raises a 
qualified immunity defense turning on an issue of law.  See 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 670-75 (2009); Argueta v. 
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 69 
(3d Cir. 2011) (―Pursuant to Iqbal, our appellate jurisdiction 
extends beyond merely determining whether the complaint 
avers a clearly established constitutional violation, and we 
also have the power to consider the sufficiency of the 
complaint itself.‖). 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court‘s 
denial of Appellants‘ motion to dismiss.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
at 674; Argueta, 643 F.3d at 69. 
IV. Discussion 
We must decide whether the Complaint adequately 
alleges Appellants‘ personal involvement in the violation of 
Bistrian‘s clearly established constitutional rights.  Appellants 
claim the Complaint ―attributes a string of several defendants 
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to each allegation of wrongful conduct,‖ and in doing so ―this 
‗everyone in the institution‘ pleading . . . fails to provide the 
personal involvement or some affirmative action by the 
individual defendants.‖  Appellants‘ Br. 3.  They also argue 
that they are entitled to qualified immunity because some of 
the alleged misconduct does not involve the violation of 
clearly established constitutional rights.  Thus, they insist that 
the Complaint must be dismissed. 
A. The Pleading Standard 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a 
pleading contain a ―short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.‖  The Supreme 
Court‘s most recent explications of this Rule appear in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Iqbal.  
Our Court has had several occasions to examine those 
decisions in depth, see, e.g., Argueta, 643 F.3d at 70-73; 
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129-30 (3d Cir. 
2010); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-211 
(3d Cir. 2009), and so we begin by recounting only their 
essential teachings. 
The touchstone of the pleading standard is plausibility.  
The Court in Iqbal explained that  
[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to 
state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.  A claim has 
facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content 
that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the 
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misconduct alleged.  The 
plausibility standard is not akin to 
a probability requirement, but it 
asks for more than a sheer 
possibility that a defendant has 
acted unlawfully.  Where a 
complaint pleads facts that are 
merely consistent with a 
defendant‘s liability, it stops short 
of the line between possibility and 
plausibility of entitlement to 
relief. 
556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotation marks 
omitted).   
To determine whether a complaint meets the pleading 
standard, our analysis unfolds in three steps.  First, we outline 
the elements a plaintiff must plead to a state a claim for relief.  
See id. at 675; Argueta, 643 F.3d at 73.  Next, we peel away 
those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus 
not entitled to the assumption of truth.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
679; Argueta, 643 F.3d at 73.  Finally, we look for well-pled 
factual allegations, assume their veracity, and then ―determine 
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.‖  
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Argueta, 643 F.3d at 73.  This last step 
is ―a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.‖  Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 679.  
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court recognized an 
implied private right of action for damages against federal 
officials who have violated a person‘s Fourth Amendment 
rights.  403 U.S. 388 (1971).  The Court has extended the 
Bivens implied right of action to suits for damages brought 
21 
 
under the equal protection component of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Davis v. Passman, 442 
U.S. 228 (1979), and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, see Carlson v. Green, 446 
U.S. 14 (1980).  Since Carlson, however, the Court ―has 
consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new 
context or new category of defendants.‖ Corr. Servs. Corp. v. 
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001).  Nonetheless, ―[i]n the 
limited settings where Bivens does apply, the implied cause of 
action is the ‗federal analog to suits brought against state 
officials under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983.‘‖  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
675-76 (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 
(2006)).  When the claim is available, ―[t]he factors necessary 
to establish a Bivens violation will vary with the 
constitutional provision at issue.‖  Id. at 676. 
But unlike other legal contexts, ―[g]overnment 
officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional 
conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat 
superior.‖  Id.  ―Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to 
Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each 
Government-official defendant, through the official‘s own 
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.‖  Id.5 
                                              
5
 This case gives us no occasion to wade into the muddied 
waters of post-Iqbal ―supervisory liability.‖  ―Numerous 
courts, including this one, have expressed uncertainty as to 
the viability and scope of supervisory liability after Iqbal.‖ 
Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130 n.8 (collecting cases); see also 
Argueta, 643 F.3d at 70.  Neither the parties nor the District 
Court mention ―supervisory liability‖ as a possible basis for 
recovery here.  As we understand his claims, Bistrian alleges 
that the named defendants directly and personally participated 
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Moreover, the sufficiency of a plaintiff‘s allegations in 
a Bivens action is ―inextricably interwined with‖ and ―directly 
implicated by‖ the defense of qualified immunity.  Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 673.  Under that defense, ―government officials 
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.‖  
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  For a 
constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours 
―must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right.‖  
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).  To meet 
this test, generally ―there must be sufficient precedent at the 
time of [the defendant‘s] action, factually similar to the 
plaintiff‘s allegations, to put [the] defendant on notice that his 
or her conduct is constitutionally prohibited.‖  McLaughlin v. 
Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 572 (3d Cir. 2001).  Thus, to 
overcome the assertion of qualified immunity at the motion to 
dismiss stage, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead not only a 
violation of a constitutional or statutory right, but also a 
violation of a clearly established one. 
B. Counts I & II:  Failure to Protect from  
  Inmate Violence 
―Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part 
of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses 
against society.‖  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 
(1994) (quotation marks omitted).  As such, the Eighth 
Amendment‘s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
imposes on prison officials ―a duty to protect prisoners from 
violence at the hands of other prisoners.‖  Id. at 833 
                                                                                                     
in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.  That is the only 
theory of recovery we consider.  
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(quotation marks omitted); see also Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 
256 F.3d 120, 130-33 (3d Cir. 2001); Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 
F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997).   
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, however, 
does not apply until an inmate has been both convicted of and 
sentenced for his crimes.  See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 
386, 392 n.6 (1989); Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 
(3d Cir. 2005) (hereinafter ―Hubbard I‖).  Thus, an inmate 
awaiting sentencing must look to either the Fifth 
Amendment‘s or the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process 
Clause for protection.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S 520, 535 
n.16 (1979); Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341-42 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  We have not yet in a precedential opinion 
recognized that an unsentenced inmate may bring a due 
process-grounded failure-to-protect claim of the sort that a 
sentenced inmate can bring under the Eighth Amendment.  
But it is well established that, under the Constitution‘s 
guarantees of due process, an unsentenced inmate ―is 
entitled[,] at a minimum, to no less protection than a 
sentenced inmate is entitled to under the Eighth Amendment.‖  
Fuentes, 206 F.3d at 344 (quotation marks and alterations 
omitted).  Therefore, Bistrian — as an inmate who at all 
relevant times was either not yet convicted or convicted but 
not yet sentenced — had a clearly established constitutional 




Still, not ―every injury suffered by one prisoner at the 
hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for 
                                              
6
 Although it is a misnomer, the case law often refers to an 
inmate awaiting sentencing — even if he has pled guilty to 
his crimes or been convicted after trial — as a ―pretrial 
detainee.‖  See, e.g., Fuentes. 206 F.3d at 341-43.  
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prison officials responsible for the victim‘s safety.‖  Farmer, 
511 U.S. at 834.  To state a claim for damages against a 
prison official for failure to protect from inmate violence, an 
inmate must plead facts that show (1) he was incarcerated 
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) 
the official was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk 
to his health and safety, and (3) the official‘s deliberate 
indifference caused him harm.  Id. at 834; Hamilton, 117 F.3d 
at 746.  
―Deliberate indifference‖ in this context is a subjective 
standard:  ―the prison official-defendant must actually have 
known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety.‖  
Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d 120 at 125.  It is not sufficient that 
the official should have known of the risk.  Id. at 133.  A 
plaintiff can, however, prove an official‘s actual knowledge 
of a substantial risk to his safety ―in the usual ways, including 
inference from circumstantial evidence.‖  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 
842.  In other words, ―a factfinder may conclude that a prison 
official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the 
risk was obvious.‖  Id.   
Prison officials may escape liability for deliberate 
indifference claims in several ways.  They ―might show, for 
example, that they did not know of the underlying facts 
indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and that they were 
therefore unaware of a danger, or that they knew the 
underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk 
to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.‖  
Id. at 844.  ―In addition, prison officials who actually knew of 
a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free 
from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if 
the harm ultimately was not averted.‖  Id.  “Whether one puts 
it in terms of duty or deliberate indifference, prison officials 
who act reasonably cannot be found liable‖ on a failure-to-
protect claim.  Id. at 845; see also Hamilton, 117 F.3d at 746 
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(noting that prison officials have ―a duty . . . to take 
reasonable measures to protect prisoners from violence at the 
hands of other prisoners‖) (quotation marks omitted). 
1. The Officials‘ Alleged Deliberate 
 Indifference to the Risk Posed by 
 Bistrian‘s Continued Detention in the SHU 
We do not infer that the decision to keep Bistrian in 
the SHU after his cooperation became exposed was, by itself, 
unreasonable.  This is so whether we ―put[] it in terms of duty 
or deliberate indifference.‖  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845.  More 
is needed to sustain a failure-to-protect claim.   
BOP regulations suggest that, generally speaking, 
officials can better protect inmates when they are in the SHU 
rather than the general population.   See 28 C.F.R. § 541.22 
(describing SHUs as units ―where inmates are securely 
separated from the general inmate population‖ to ―help ensure 
the safety, security, and orderly operation of correctional 
facilities‖).  According to Bistrian‘s own allegations, inmates 
in the SHU are in solitary or near-solitary conditions ―for 23 
to 24 hours a day, with little or no opportunity to interact with 
other inmates.‖  App. 75 ¶ 12.  Given these conditions, it 
seems reasonable to assume that an inmate would generally 
be less at physical risk in the SHU than elsewhere in the 
prison. 
 Still, placing an informant in the SHU does not 
automatically shield officials from suit.  If they are 
deliberately indifferent to a particular risk that an informant 
faces while in the SHU, that may form the basis of a failure-
to-protect claim.  For example, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit has held that allowing an inmate with known, 
violent propensities to have access to an informant in 
administrative segregation was unreasonable and thus a 
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possible constitutional violation.  Yet it described the decision 
to move the informant to administrative segregation in the 
first place as ―an apparently reasonable response.‖  Reece v. 
Groose, 60 F.3d 487, 491 (8th Cir. 1995).  Here too we 
conclude that keeping Bistrian in the SHU was itself not 
unreasonable, but we also consider whether Bistrian has 
plausibly alleged that officials were deliberately indifferent to 
specific and substantial risks that he faced while in the SHU. 
2. The Officials‘ Alleged Deliberate 
 Indifference to the Risk Posed by         
 Bistrian‘s Placement in a Locked 
 Recreation Pen with Northington, et al.  
After stripping away conclusory allegations not 
entitled to the presumption of truth, we conclude that Bistrian 
states a plausible failure-to-protect claim against the ten 
Prison Management Defendants, Lts. Rodgers and Robinson, 
and Sr. Officer Bowns based on Bistrian‘s placement in the 
recreation yard with Northington and his gang.  First, Bistrian 
alleges that putting him in a locked recreation area with 
Northington et al. posed a substantial risk of serious harm 
because (a) Northington and others knew of Bistrian‘s 
cooperation with prison officials plus (b) Northington had a 
violent criminal past and had previously threatened to attack 
Bistrian in the recreation yard because of that cooperation.  
Second, Bistrian alleges that officials were deliberately 
indifferent to the obvious risk posed because they made no 
attempt to prevent his placement in the yard with Northington 
despite the fact that he (Bistrian) repeatedly advised the 
officials responsible for the photocopying operation of the 
threats Northington and others made.  Third, Bistrian pleads 
causation: Northington and two other inmates violently 
attacked him on June 30, 2006 in the recreation yard because 
he cooperated with prison officials, not for some other reason.  
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We consider the supporting factual allegations in further 
detail.   
First, Bistrian has plausibly alleged that Northington 
and other inmates knew that he was cooperating with prison 
officials.  Bistrian claims that ―[o]n one particular occasion,‖ 
after FDC officials photocopied an intercepted note, they 
placed the photocopy in the delivery envelope instead of the 
original.  App. 91 ¶ 84.  It is reasonable to infer that the 
intended recipient could recognize the difference between a 
hand-written note and a photocopy, and immediately assume 
Bistrian‘s cooperation with prison officials.  Bistrian also 
alleges that, on unspecified occasions, officials failed to 
return to him all notes for delivery.  App. 91 ¶ 85.  Again, it is 
reasonable to infer that the inmates who sent the undelivered 
notes eventually learned that they were not delivered and 
assumed Bistrian‘s cooperation with prison officials.  We are 
further convinced of the reasonableness of these inferences 
because Bistrian began receiving multiple threats from the 
notes‘ intended recipients, including Northington, who 
threatened him on more than one occasion when they were 
together in the recreation yard.  App. 91-92 ¶ 86.     
Next, having plausibly pled that Northington and other 
inmates knew of his cooperation, Bistrian has also plausibly 
pled that that they were likely to retaliate violently if placed 
in the same locked recreation cage.  Northington was not a 
non-violent, white-collar criminal.  He was a member of a 
violent drug gang with a prior conviction for (among other 
things) robbery and aggravated assault.  App. 89 ¶¶ 74-75.  At 
the time he was also a co-defendant in an ongoing 
prosecution that involved substantial witness intimidation, 
death threats to witnesses and law enforcement, and a 
firebombing that killed six family members of the 
Government‘s chief cooperating witness.  App. 90 ¶¶ 78-79.  
Not only did Northington have violent propensities, but he 
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made his violent intentions quite clear by threatening Bistrian 
on more than one occasion when they were together in the 
recreation yard.  App. 91-92 ¶ 86 
Turning to the officials‘ supposed deliberate 
indifference, Bistrian plausibly alleges that certain prison 
officials actually knew that he faced an excessive risk of harm 
by being placed in the SHU recreation yard with Northington 
and his cronies but failed to take any preventive measures.  
According to Bistrian, he ―repeatedly advised (both verbally 
and in writing)‖ FDC officials, including Lts. Gibbs, Rodgers, 
and Robinson, Sr. Officers Bowns, Jezior, and Bergos, and 
Special Investigative Agents McLaughlin and Garraway, of 
the multiple threats Northington and others made after 
Bistrian‘s cooperation was exposed as well as the specific risk 
that he would suffer serious harm if placed in the recreation 
yard with them at same time.  App. 92 ¶ 87.  Yet, based on 
what is before us, nothing was done to abate the potential 
threat.   
We acknowledge that when inmates claim they are in 
danger, they confront prison officials with an ―arduous task.‖  
Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 363 n.23 (3d Cir. 1992).  
―[P]risoners may feign their fear of physical harm simply to 
manipulate a transfer,‖ in the hope, for example, of obtaining 
more desirable living arrangements.  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted).  But here, Bistrian sets out sufficient factual 
allegations, which we must accept as true, that make his 
repeated pleas radically different from an out-of-the-blue and 
unadorned ―I‘m-in-trouble‖ entreaty.  The eight officials that 
Bistrian claims he ―repeatedly advised (both verbally and in 
writing)‖ were the very officials that orchestrated the botched 
note-photocopying operation.  App. 90 ¶¶ 80-82.  Given their 
familiarity with the scheme and the players involved, it is 
quite plausible that they knew Bistrian‘s cries for help were 
legitimate and that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm.  
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After all, the genesis of the operation was a desire to assist an 
FBI investigation into violent criminal activity by 
Northington and others that included, among other things, 
substantial witness intimidation.  App. 90 ¶ 78. 
Moreover, the alleged number of tortfeasors in this 
case does not undermine the plausibility of the underlying 
torts.  In Young v. Quinlan, we allowed an inmate‘s failure-to-
protect claim to proceed past summary judgment when, 
among other things, he claimed to have ―told [ten named 
prison officials] several times that he was concerned for his 
safety and needed to be placed in protective custody,‖ and 
each of these ten officials had failed to respond reasonably to 
stop the assaults by other inmates.  960 F.2d 351, 363 (3d Cir. 
1992).  Here too the fact that Bistrian claims to have 
specifically warned eight officials of the risks he faced does 
not transform his allegations into impermissible ―group 
pleading.‖ 
In addition, it is reasonable to infer at this early stage 
that the other Prison Management Defendants also knew of 
the substantial risk Bistrian faced by being put in the same 
locked recreation yard as Northington and failed to respond 
reasonably.  Bistrian claims that the ten Prison Management 
Defendants met ―[o]n a weekly basis . . . to review the list of 
inmates in the SHU and discuss and determine which inmates 
would be released from the SHU and which inmates would 
remain confined.‖  App. 80 ¶ 38.  Five (Gibbs, Jezior, Bergos, 
McLaughlin, and Garraway) of those ten people were 
involved in the note operation and, for the reasons discussed 
above, plausibly were aware of the risk Bistrian faced.  
Affording Bistrian all reasonable inferences from his 
allegations and construing them in the light most favorable to 
him, as we must, it is plausible that these five Appellants 
discussed the problems with the note operations and the 
threats Bistrian repeatedly reported with the remainder of the 
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Prison Management Defendants during their weekly 
meetings.   
Of course, discovery may reveal that some Prison 
Management Defendants did not know that the lid had been 
blown off the note sting, or, if they did know, that some 
objected to Bistrian‘s continued use of the recreation yard 
with the inmates he cooperated against.  At this point, 
however, we cannot expect clairvoyance from Bistrian.  He 
obviously was not present for Prison Management 
Defendants‘ meetings, but he has alleged other facts that 
plausibly suggest that they knew about his situation and failed 
to respond.  Further investigation will show what was 
discussed behind closed doors. 
Finally, Bistrian has alleged adequate facts to suggest 
that he was attacked as a result of his being an informant and 
the FDC officials‘ failure to respond reasonably to the 
dissemination of that fact.  It can be plausibly inferred from 
the fact Northington himself was one of the assailants that he 
attacked Bistrian because of the latter‘s cooperation.  Further, 
Northington‘s behavior immediately before and after that 
attack also suggests that it occurred because Bistrian was an 
informant.  Northington and two other SHU inmates 
approached Bistrian in the SHU recreation pen and began 
arguing about a note that he failed to deliver.  App. 93 ¶ 92.  
In a post-attack interview, Northington complained about 
being in prison ―because of rats‖ and lamented how Bistrian 
was ―being used to get him [Northington] another case.‖  
App. 237. 
In sum, Bistrian has stated a plausible claim that 
thirteen officials violated their constitutional duty to protect 
him from inmate violence by being deliberately indifferent to 
the risk posed by his placement in the recreation yard with 
Northington and others who knew of his prior complicity with 
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prison authorities.  If this claim fails to survive a motion to 
dismiss, little does.   
3. The Officials‘ Alleged Deliberate 
 Indifference to the Risk Posed by 
 Bistrian‘s Placement in a Locked 
 Recreation Pen with Taylor 
 Given prisoners‘ attitudes about ―snitches,‖ it is 
reasonable to infer that placing Bistrian in a locked recreation 
pen with any violent inmates, not only those he specifically 
cooperated against, created a substantial risk of serious harm.  
But Bistrian does not allege that Taylor had any connection to 
Northington and his cohorts or that Taylor otherwise attacked 
him because he was an informant.  Instead, Bistrian refers to 
Taylor‘s ―history of violent assaults against other inmates‖ in 
his complaint, and generally creates the impression that 
Taylor‘s attack was unprovoked, inexplicable, and unrelated 
to his participation in the note-copying operation.  App. 96 ¶ 
105; 97 ¶ 107; 110 ¶ 158.
7
  Thus, according to Bistrian, the 
risk of the harm that occurred was the risk that an inmate with 
a history of violence might attack another inmate for an 
unknown reason.  We cannot conclude on these allegations 
that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to such a 
speculative risk. 
                                              
7
 Lt. Acker‘s report of the incident, which was attached to 
Bistrian‘s complaint, suggests the attack may have been 
motivated by Taylor‘s belief that Bistrian was a racist.  App. 
276.  Bistrian makes no reference in the complaint itself to 
the apparent racial tensions infecting FDC Philadelphia at the 
time, which we described in our opinion in Taylor‘s case, nor 
to Taylor‘s allegations that Bistrian instigated the attack in the 
yard by telling Taylor that he was ―going down.‖  See Taylor, 
686 F.3d at 185. 
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4. The Officials‘ Alleged Failure to Intervene 
 Appropriately in the Assaults 
In Smith v. Messinger, we held that a corrections 
officer who fails to intervene when other officers are beating 
an inmate may be liable on a failure-to-protect claim if the 
officer had ―a realistic and reasonable opportunity to 
intervene‖ and ―simply refused to do so.‖  293 F.3d 641, 650-
51 (3d Cir. 2002).  We are hardly breaking new ground by 
extending this standard to inmate-on-inmate attacks.  As the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has observed, if an 
officer witnesses an inmate assault and fails to intervene, ―his 
actions would seemingly constitute a paradigm case of 
deliberate indifference.‖  Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 
763, 778 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).   
In this case, Bistrian faults the guards who were 
present for his assaults for not responding quickly and 
aggressively enough.  No doubt, there are some 
circumstances in which an officer‘s response to an inmate 
attack is so half-hearted that it effectively amounts to no 
response at all.  If well-pled, such a claim can survive a 
motion to dismiss.  But surely there are cases at the other end 
of the spectrum in which an inmate fails to allege that an 
officer‘s response was so unreasonable as to give rise to an 
entitlement to relief.  For example, if an inmate alleges that an 
assailant landed two punches in rapid succession, the fact that 
guards saw the first punch and reacted quickly enough to 
prevent a third, but not the second, is not unreasonable.  Such 
an allegation would not survive a motion to dismiss.  The key 
is whether prison officials acted reasonably; if so, they cannot 
be found liable on a failure-to-protect claim.  See Farmer, 
511 U.S. at 845.     
With respect to the Northington attack, Bistrian claims 
that Sr. Officer Jezior was deliberately indifferent because he 
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intervened ―[o]nly after several minutes of continued 
pummeling.‖  App. 93-94 ¶ 95.  But, according to Jezior‘s 
post-incident memorandum (which Bistrian attached to his 
complaint), Jezior was not standing around and doing 
nothing.  He came to the SHU recreation pen in response to 
an alarm and, when he arrived, several officers (himself 
included) unsuccessfully ordered the assailant to stop.  App. 
250.  When ―enough staff were present,‖ they entered the pen 
and subdued the assailant.  Id.  At this point, we must 
construe the facts in the light most favorable to Bistrian and 
afford him all reasonable inferences.  With that in mind, we 
believe that Bistrian‘s allegations raise enough questions 
about the reasonableness of Jezior‘s response to preclude 
dismissal.  How long did Jezior shout orders to Northington 
before realizing that his words were futile?  How often, in 
Jezior‘s experience, does a prisoner stop violently assaulting 
another inmate simply because a guard orders him to do so?  
How many guards are ―enough‖ to break up a fist fight?  
Discovery is needed.  It may be that summary judgment for 
Jezior is on the horizon.  But right now we conclude that 
Bistrian has plausibly alleged that Jezior responded 
unreasonably to the attack, and thus this claim survives a 
motion to dismiss. 
We reach a different result with respect to the Taylor 
attack.  To repeat, officials at the scene attempted to stop the 
attack by firing pepper spray into the recreation cage.  When 
this proved ineffective, they used a ―Tactical Blast Stun 
Munition‖ to incapacitate Taylor.  App. 97 ¶ 109; 269.  
Bistrian insists that Captain Knox and Lts. Acker and 
Dempsey acted with deliberate indifference by delaying their 
use of the Tactical Blast Stun Munition and their decision to 
intervene forcibly.  App. 97 ¶ 111.  Given the facts alleged, it 
is difficult, if not impossible, for us to glean deliberate 
indifference from the guards‘ weapon of choice.  Although 
the pepper spray ultimately proved ineffective, Bistrian does 
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not allege facts that suggest the decision to use it was 
unreasonable. 
C. Count III:  Punitive Detention 
Next, Bistrian argues that his detention in 
administrative segregation for 447 days deprived him of his 
clearly established liberty interest to be free from punishment 
before sentencing, in violation of the Fifth Amendment‘s Due 
Process Clause. 
It is important to explain the significance of Bistrian‘s 
constitutional status as a ―pretrial detainee,‖ a category of 
detainees that includes all inmates awaiting sentencing.  A 
conviction alone does not extinguish all liberty interests 
protected by the Constitution‘s guarantee of due process:  
―[t]he right to remain at liberty continues until a court 
pronounces a judgment of sentence, although after a jury has 
pronounced a guilty verdict the court may insist upon greater 
assurance that a defendant will submit to sentence.‖ Cobb v. 
Aytch, 643 F.2d 946, 962 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc).  As such, 
pretrial detainees have ―federally protected liberty interests 
that are different in kind from those of sentenced inmates.‖  
Id. at 957.  ―Unlike sentenced prisoners, who . . . must look to 
state law for the protection of their personal liberties, pretrial 
detainees have liberty interests firmly grounded in federal 
constitutional law.‖  Id. 
Given pretrial detainees‘ federally protected liberty 
interests, the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish held that 
―under the Due Process Clause . . . a detainee may not be 
punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with 
due process of law.‖  441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).8  Still, ―[n]ot 
                                              
8
 Although pretrial detainees are, at least, on equal footing 
with sentenced inmates when they claim that prison officials 
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every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts to 
‗punishment‘ in the constitutional sense . . . .‖  Id. at 537.  For 
example, conditions that are reasonably related to a penal 
institution‘s interest in maintaining jail security typically pass 
constitutional muster.  Id. at 540.  Under Bell, a ―particular 
measure amounts to punishment when there is a showing of 
express intent to punish on the part of detention facility 
officials, when the restriction or condition is not rationally 
related to a legitimate non-punitive government purpose, or 
when the restriction is excessive in light of that purpose.‖  
Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1999)).  ―In 
evaluating a pretrial detainees‘s claim of unconstitutional 
punishment, courts must examine the totality of the 
circumstances within the institution.‖  Id.  Since Bell, we have 
conducted exhaustive examinations of the Court‘s ―no-
punishing-pretrial-detainees‖ rule and applied the Court‘s 
teachings in a long series of decisions.  See, e.g., Hubbard v. 
Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 231-36 (3d Cir. 2008) (hereinafter 
―Hubbard II‖); Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 67-69; Hubbard I, 399 
F.3d at 157-68; Fuentes, 206 F.3d at 341-43; Union Cnty. Jail 
Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984, 991-92 (3d Cir. 1983). 
Despite our history with the Bell test and the 
distinction it draws between those inmates sentenced and 
those not, Appellants confusingly pin their qualified 
immunity hopes to our decisions in Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 
                                                                                                     
failed to protect them from other inmates, they have an 
indisputable advantage when they claim that they were 
unconstitutionally punished.  See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16 
(1979) (―Due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be 
punished.  A sentenced inmate, on the other hand, may be 
punished, although that punishment may not be ‗cruel and 
unusual‘ under the Eighth Amendment.‖). 
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F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 1997), and Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 
335 (3d Cir. 2000).  See Appellants‘ Br. 48-49.  In Griffin we 
held that the conditions experienced by a sentenced inmate 
while in the SHU did not impose on him an ―atypical and 
significant hardship‖ such that he was deprived of a state-
created liberty interest in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s Due Process Clause.  112 F.3d at 706 (quoting 
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).  But as Griffin 
itself makes clear and as we have explained at least twice 
before, Sandin‘s ―atypical and significant hardship‖ test 
applies only to sentenced inmates, while the Bell test applies 
to pretrial detainees.  See Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 69 n.4 
(―Sandin does not apply [to pretrial detainees].  Sandin 
concerned punishment of a sentenced prisoner, and therefore 
required a completely different analysis.‖) (quoting Fuentes, 
206 F.3d at 342 n.9).   
Fuentes also offers Appellants no help.  They point to 
our statement in that case that ―it is impractical to draw a line 
between convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees for the 
purpose of maintaining jail security.‖  Appellants Br. 49 
(quoting Fuentes, 206 F.3d at 347).  This selective quotation 
is, at best, misguided and closer to misleading.  As we 
explained in Fuentes, ―claims based on excessive force and 
claims based on conditions of confinement are different in 
kind.‖  206 F.3d at 347 (quoting Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 
F.2d 1440, 1446 (5th Cir. 1993)).  Because of this difference, 
we did not apply the Bell due process standard concerning 
confinement to a pretrial detainee‘s excessive force claim.  
Instead, we held that the more demanding ―Eighth 
Amendment cruel and unusual punishments standards found 
in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) and Hudson v. 
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) apply to a pretrial detainee‘s 
excessive force claim arising in the context of a prison 
disturbance.‖  Id. (emphasis in original).  Not surpisingly, in 
that context we could ―draw no logical or practical distinction 
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between a prison disturbance involving pretrial detainees, 
convicted but unsentenced inmates, or sentenced inmates.‖  
Id.  Nor could we expect prison guards ―to draw such precise 
distinctions between classes of inmates when those guards are 
trying to stop a prison disturbance.‖  Id. at 347-48.  We are 
puzzled, to say the least, how Fuentes assists Appellants in 
their assertion that they are entitled to qualified immunity 
from Bistrian‘s conditions-of-confinement claim. 
Here, Bistrian alleges that officials punished him by 
placing him in the SHU for 447 days of administrative 
segregation.  With respect to the nature of his confinement in 
the SHU, he claims: 
 ―Inmates … receive meals in their cells with no 
communal time permitted‖; 
 ―Recreational activities in the SHU are virtually 
nonexistent, and basic supplies such as paper 
and pencils are difficult to obtain‖; 
 ―Inmates housed in the SHU are confined to 
solitary or near-solitary confinement … for 23 
to 24 hours a day, with little or no opportunity 
to interact with other inmates…,‖ together with 
―sensory deprivation, with poorly lighted cells 
and smoked windows to prevent outside 
visibility‖; 
  ―Medical care in the SHU is absent or 
deficient‖; and 
 ―Inmates housed in the SHU have reduced 
access to personal property and to legal 
materials and have limited ability to file 
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administrative grievances,‖ and ―[a]ccess to 
legal counsel is limited.‖ 
App. 75 ¶ 12.  In addition, Bistrian alleges that ―[d]ue to the 
SHU‘s isolative and claustrophobic nature, suicide attempts 
are not uncommon in the SHU … [, where] there is a greater 
tendency among inmates to attempt suicide‖ than in other 
parts of the prison. App. 75 ¶ 13.   
Given these conditions, Bistrian‘s complaint raises the 
reasonable inference that some of his time spent in 
administrative detention was excessive in light of any 
legitimate non-punitive government purpose for his 
segregation.  Bistrian was first confined in administrative 
detention in the SHU from November 18, 2005 until 
December 9, 2005, pending a hearing on the ―minor offense 
of telephone abuse – non-criminal.‖  App. 85 ¶¶ 57-59.  After 
a DHO sanctioned him to 30 days‘ disciplinary segregation, 
he was released from the SHU on January 9, 2006.  App. 85 
¶¶ 59.  Given Appellants‘ failure to assert any legitimate non-
punitive need for the segregation, Bistrian has plausibly 
alleged that it was excessive to keep him in the SHU for 
nearly a month while awaiting a hearing on seemingly minor 
telephone infractions.   
The same may be said for Bistrian‘s second stint in the 
SHU for alleged telephone infractions, starting on January, 
2006, though only until April or May, 2006, when Bistrian 
agreed to intercept notes and cooperate against his fellow 
detainees.  For the remainder of his second stay and his third 
(from December 22, 2006 to January 25, 2007), prison 
officials had a legitimate non-punitive purpose for Bistrian‘s 
detention in the SHU — having him participate in the note-
copying scheme and keeping him in what they thought was 
the safest possible place in the prison.  With respect to his 
fourth confinement in the SHU, however, it is plausibly 
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alleged that Warden Levi expressly intended to punish 
Bistrian by placing him there after his lawyer challenged his 
previous confinement.  
As discussed above, it is sufficient at this point that 
Bistrian has alleged that the Prison Management Defendants 
each shared responsibility for his placement in the SHU.  He 
has not sufficiently pled, however, how Lt. Rodgers, Lt. 
Robinson, and Lt. Armisak, who are not among the Prison 
Management Defendants, were involved in the violation of 
his substantive due process rights.  
D. Count IV:  Violation of Bistrian’s Procedural 
  Due Process Rights 
―Although pretrial detainees do not have a liberty 
interest in being confined in the general prison population, 
they do have a liberty interest in not being detained 
indefinitely in the SHU without explanation or review of their 
confinement.‖  Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 69.  Thus, procedural 
due process requires prison officials to ―provide detainees 
who are transferred into more restrictive housing [,] for 
administrative purposes only [,] an explanation of the reason 
for their transfer as well as an opportunity to respond.‖  Id. at 
70.   
Although Stevenson was decided in July 2007, after 
Bistrian had already been confined in the SHU three times, 
the rule the case announces was ―compelled by our holding in 
Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2000).‖  Stevenson, 495 
F.3d at 69.  In Shoats, we reaffirmed that sentenced inmates 
are entitled to minimal due process under the Supreme 
Court‘s decision in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), 
which held that the removal of a sentenced inmate from the 
general prison population and his transfer into administrative 
segregation requires at least a minimal degree of process.  213 
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F.3d at 144.  As we explained in Stevenson, ―the protections 
due to sentenced inmates [as discussed in Hewitt and Shoats] 
provide a floor for what pretrial detainees may expect.‖  495 
F.3d at 69.  Therefore, the law was sufficiently clear prior to 
Stevenson that Plaintiff was entitled to an explanation and 
opportunity to challenge his confinement. 
Here, however, the District Court did not address 
Bistrian‘s procedural due process claim at all.  Taking a 
similar route to the one we took in Stevenson, we ask the 
Court to consider the issue in the first instance by 
―examin[ing] the asserted purposes for [Bistrian‘s] detention, 
and determin[ing] whether sufficient process has been 
afforded.‖  Id. at 71.  
E. Count X:  First Amendment Retaliation 
Bistrian claims the Prison Management Defendants 
detained him in the SHU for a fourth time on September 13, 
2007, in retaliation for protesting his prior confinements in 
the SHU.  App. 101 ¶ 128.  As noted, the day after the 
Assistant U.S. Attorney handling Bistrian‘s case notified 
officials at FDC Philadelphia that Bistrian had challenged his 
prior confinements in the SHU, he was (1) returned to the 
SHU, (2) received an administrative detention order 
indicating that he was being held ―pending investigation‖ of 
alleged telephone infractions, and (3) attended a hearing 
before the Unit Disciplinary Committee (where he promptly 
received the sanction of a loss of phone privileges for 60 
days).  App. 101 ¶¶ 128-30.  After Bistrian‘s counsel asked 
Warden Levi to release Bistrian from the SHU, the Warden 
purportedly told Bistrian he ―would not see the light of day 
again.‖ App. 102 ¶¶ 133.  Levi also allegedly sent FDC staff 
members to coerce Bistrian into confessing by telling him that 
he would not be released from the SHU unless he confessed 
to the alleged violations.  App.  102 ¶ 134.  
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Retaliating against a prisoner for the exercise of his 
constitutional rights is unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. 
Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529-31 (3d Cir. 2003); Rauser v. Horn, 
241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (3d Cir. 2001); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 224-26 (3d Cir. 2000).  To state a claim for 
retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he was engaged in 
constitutionally protected conduct, (2) ―he suffered some 
‗adverse action‘ at the hands of the prison officials‖; and (3) 
―his constitutionally protected conduct was ‗a substantial or 
motivating factor‘ in the decision‖ to take that action.  
Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333.
9
 
The plausibility of Bistrian‘s allegations with respect 
to the first and third elements is not in dispute.  Instead, 
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 We acknowledge that the Supreme Court has been reluctant 
to extend the Bivens implied right of action to new contexts, 
and in recent cases has conspicuously avoided extending it to 
First Amendment claims.  See Reichle v. Howards, 132 S.Ct. 
2088, 2093 n.4 (2012) (―We have never held that Bivens 
extends to First Amendment claims.‖); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (―Because implied causes of action are 
disfavored, the Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens 
liability to any new context or new category of defendants. 
 . . . Indeed, we have declined to extend Bivens to a claim 
sounding in the First Amendment.  Petitioners do not press 
this argument, however, so we assume, without deciding, that 
respondent‘s First Amendment claim is actionable under 
Bivens.‖).  Our Court, however, relying on Bivens, has held 
that ―a federal cause of action for damages may be implied 
directly from the [F]irst [A]mendment.‖  Milhouse v. Carlson, 
652 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Paton v. La Prade, 




Appellants argue that Bistrian has not plausibly alleged an 
―adverse action‖ because he was not ―impeded in his efforts 
to complain to the outside world about his confinement in 
[the] SHU.‖ Appellants‘ Br. 55.  But whether placement in 
the SHU was ―sufficient to deter a person of ordinary 
firmness from exercising his constitutional rights‖ is an 
objective inquiry and ultimately a question of fact.  Rausser, 
241 F.3d at 333; see also Allah, 229 F.3d at 225.  In Allah, we 
explained that where ―confinement in administrative 
segregation resulted, inter alia, in reduced access to phone 
calls, reduced access to the commissary, reduced access to 
recreation, confinement in his cell for all but five hours per 
week, denial of access to rehabilitative programs and, 
significantly, inadequate access to legal research materials 
and assistance,‖ ―[a] fact finder could conclude from those 
facts that retaliatory continued placement in administrative 
confinement would ‗deter a person of ordinary firmness from 
exercising his First Amendment rights.‘‖  Id. (quoting Suppan 
v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)).  As described 
above, Bistrian has alleged very similar facts as to the nature 
of this confinement in the SHU.  Thus, his allegations create a 
plausible inference that continued placement in the SHU was 
retaliatory and in violation of his free speech rights.  
V. Conclusion 
 For these reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, 
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  To 
summarize, in addition to Bistrian‘s deliberate indifference 
claim against Reynolds, which was not at issue here, the 
following claims against the following defendants remain. 
Count I:  Fifth Amendment Substantive Due Process (Failure 
to Protect)  
 
 Claim:  Appellants were deliberately indifferent to the 
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risk posed by placing Bistrian in the same locked 
recreation pen as Northington and his gang.   
 
 Appellants/defendants (13):  (1-10) The 10 Prison 
Management Defendants; (11) Sr. Officer Bowns; (12) 
Lt. Rodgers; and (13) Lt. Robinson. 
 
 Claim/defendant:  Jezior was deliberately indifferent to 
Bistrian‘s safety during the Northington attack. 
 
Count III:  Fifth Amendment Substantive Due Process 
(Punitive Detention) 
 Claim:  Bistrian‘s first detention in the SHU, his 
second until the beginning of the note-copying 
operation, and his fourth, deprived him of his liberty 
interest, as an inmate awaiting sentencing, to be free 
from punishment. 
 
 Appellants/defendants (10):  (1-10) The 10 Prison 
Management Defendants. 
 
Count V:  Fifth Amendment Procedural Due Process 
 Claim:  Bistrian‘s placement and continued detention 
in the SHU failed to comply with the Fifth 
Amendment‘s procedural due process requirements. 
 
 Appellants/defendants (11):  (1-10) The 10 Prison 




Count X:  First Amendment (Retaliation) 
 Claim:  Bistrian‘s placement and continued detention 
in SHU after his attorney challenged Bistrian‘s 
previous placement was retaliatory for exercising his 
First Amendment rights. 
 
 Appellants/defendants (10):  (1-10) The 10 Prison 
Management Defendants. 
 
 
 
